He has few quick-fix options if Western intelligence and open-source analysis are accurate, and most of the potential steps he could take come with domestic and geopolitical risks. Since coming to power in 1999, Islamist militants in Chechnya and the wider North Caucasus region have been among the toughest armed enemies Putin has faced. In that case, he chose to escalate with more power. Sign up now for FREE unlimited access to Reuters.comSign up These are some of his top picks in Ukraine:
STABILIZATION, RE-GROUP, ATTACK
Russian and Western military analysts agree that — from Moscow’s point of view — Russian forces must urgently stabilize the front line, halt the Ukrainian advance, regroup and, if they can, launch their own counteroffensive. But there are doubts in the West about whether Russia has ground forces or sufficient equipment, considering how many casualties it has suffered and how much material has been abandoned or destroyed during what Russia calls a “special military operation” to destroy the Ukrainian military . “There is no manpower,” said Konrad Muzyka, director of Poland’s Rochan Consulting, after Russia’s setback in the northeast. “The volunteer battalions are out and the recruiting campaign is not working as expected. And I think it will get worse, as fewer men will now want to join. If Moscow wants to add men, it needs to mobilize.” Russian efforts to increase the number of troops it can deploy include the formation of a new 3rd Army Corps, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov amassing new forces and Putin last month signing a decree to increase the size of its armed forces. of Russia. read more Putin will have to decide whether to accede to demands by nationalist critics to fire or reshuffle top military officials, including Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, a close ally. Putin has traditionally not bowed to immediate pressure to fire subordinates, but sometimes parted ways with them later.
MOBILIZATION
Mobilizing Russia’s reservists, numbering about 2 million men with military service over the past five years, is possible, but it takes time to train and develop people. The Kremlin said on Tuesday there was no talk of a national mobilization “for now”. read more Such a move would be popular with nationalists, but less so with some Russian men in urban centers who, anecdotally, are less willing to join the fight. It would mean recalibrating official messaging about Ukraine and moving away from describing it as “a special military operation” with limited objectives to an open-ended war. That in turn would force the authorities to abandon their policy of trying to ensure that life for most Russians continues as it was before February 24, when Putin invaded Ukraine. Putting Russia on a full war footing would also entail domestic political risks, particularly the risk of a public backlash against a coercive plan. It would also be an admission that Russia is engaged in a full-scale war against a Slavic country – and that the war is going badly for Moscow. Andrei Kortunov, head of RIAC, a think tank close to the Russian foreign ministry, said he believed the authorities were reluctant to mobilize. “In big cities, many people don’t want to go to fight, and mobilization is not likely to be popular,” Kortunov said. “Secondly, I think it’s arguably in Putin’s interest to present the whole thing as a limited operation. The state would like to keep as much as possible as before without making radical changes.” Tony Brendon, Britain’s former ambassador to Russia, has said it would take months before a mobilization would have any effect on Russia’s fighting power in any case.
BET ON “GENERAL WINTER”
Two Russian sources familiar with Kremlin thinking told Reuters last month that Putin hopes soaring energy prices and possible shortages this winter will persuade Europe to heavily arm Ukraine in a truce — on Russia’s terms. read more Some European diplomats believe Ukraine’s recent success on the battlefield has undermined the urge among some Europeans to pressure Kyiv into making concessions, while countries such as Germany appear to have gotten tougher on Moscow in recent weeks and more determined to overcome winter energy problems. read more The European Union banned Russian coal and approved a partial ban on Russian crude oil imports. Russia in turn sharply cut gas exports to Europe and made clear it could ban all energy exports, a lever Putin has yet to pull.
CHEESE TARGETING EXTENSION
After its failure in northeastern Ukraine, Russia hit Ukrainian electricity infrastructure with missiles. This caused a temporary blackout in Kharkiv and the neighboring regions of Poltava and Sumy. Water supplies and mobile phone networks were also affected. The move was cheered by some Russian nationalists who would like to see Moscow use cruise missiles to cripple Ukrainian infrastructure on a more permanent basis, a move sure to attract international condemnation. The same nationalists have also long called on Moscow to strike what they call “decision-making” centers in Kyiv and elsewhere, which is unlikely to be achieved without significant collateral damage.
TERMINATION OR DOWNGRADATION OF SITE AGREEMENT
Putin has complained that a deal brokered by the UN and Turkey that allows Ukraine to export grain and other food via the Black Sea is unfair to poorer countries and Russia. read more Putin is due to hold talks this week with Turkish leader Tayyip Erdogan to discuss revising the deal, which provides Ukraine with much-needed budget revenue. If Putin wants to hurt Ukraine immediately, he could suspend or cancel the pact or refuse to renew it when it expires in November. The West and poorer countries in Africa and the Middle East would blame him for exacerbating global food shortages. would blame Ukraine.
PEACE AGREEMENT
The Kremlin says it will dictate to Kyiv the terms of any peace deal when the time comes, while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has said he will use force to liberate his country. Zelensky said that includes Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014. Moscow has repeatedly said Crimea’s status is settled forever. Concession of occupied territories in eastern Ukraine to the Russian-backed self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic or Luhansk People’s Republic also seems politically impossible for Moscow, as it has officially recognized them. The complete “liberation” of the two self-proclaimed states by Ukrainian forces was one of the main reasons cited for the “special military operation” in the first place. The return of occupied territories in southern Ukraine, where Russia partially controls three regions, also looks like a domestic hard sell. The southern Kherson region is just north of annexed Crimea and the site of a canal that supplies the Black Sea peninsula with most of its water. Along with neighboring Zaporizhzhia, Kherson also gives Russia a land corridor through which it can supply Crimea, which Moscow has touted as a major prize.
GO NUCLEAR
Russian government officials have dismissed Western suggestions that Moscow would routinely use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, but it remains a concern for some in the West. In addition to causing massive casualties, such a move could start a dangerous escalating spiral and officially drag Western countries into direct war with Russia. Russia’s nuclear doctrine allows for the use of nuclear weapons if they – or other types of weapons of mass destruction – are used against it or if the Russian state faces an existential threat from conventional weapons. Putin, in a quasi-autobiography in 2000, recalled cornering a rat with a stick when he was growing up in a dilapidated block of flats in what was then Leningrad, and was stunned when the wriggling animal pounced on him and turned the tables. Brendon, Britain’s former ambassador to Russia, has warned that a cornered Putin could go nuclear if he faces a humiliating defeat without a face-saving ramp. “If the choice for Russia is to fight a losing war, lose badly and Putin goes down, or some kind of nuclear show, I wouldn’t bet they wouldn’t go for the nuclear show,” Brendon said. Retired US General Ben Hodges, a former commander of US military forces in Europe, agrees that it is a risk, but said he considers it unlikely. “There is no real advantage on the battlefield, it would be impossible for (the) US to sit out/not respond, and I don’t think Putin or his closest advisers are suicidal,” Hodges said. Sign up now for FREE unlimited access to Reuters.comSign up Edited by William Maclean Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
